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NOTES
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT-OWNED
CORPORATIONS, THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT,
AND THE RIGHT TO JURY
TRIAL
Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(the Act)' to clarify the law with respect to suits against foreign state
defendants in the United States. Before 1976, United States courts
used the diversity statute, section 1332 of the judicial code,2 as the basis
for jurisdiction over foreign state defendants that were not immune
from suit. The Act amends the diversity statute to foreclose diversity
jurisdiction over foreign states.3 At the same time, the Act creates a
new section of the judicial code, section 1330, which grants district
courts subject matter jurisdiction over "nonjury" civil actions against
foreign states in which the claim for relief is "in personam."4 Most
importantly, section 1330 grants district courts jurisdiction in actions
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441, 1602-1611 (1976),
amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1391, 1441).
2. Before it was amended by the Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976), provided as
follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds ... $10,000 ... and is between ... (2) citizens of a State, and foreign states
or citizens or subjects thereof .. "
3. Section 3 of the Immunities Act amended section 1332(a)(2) by substituting the
following language for the language quoted supra in note 2: "(2) citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state." It is unclear, however, whether this amendment made it impossible to
maintain jurisdiction over foreign corporations under the diversity statute. See infra text
accompanying notes 58-76. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1976) specifically provides that when a foreign
state is a plaintiff, it can obtain jurisdiction over a United States defendant on diversity grounds.
This may imply that Congress intended to foreclose diversity jurisdiction when the foreign gov-
ernment-owned corporation (FGOC) is not the plaintiff.
4. Section 1330(a) provides as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiciton without regard to amount in contro-
versy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of
this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is
not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any appli-
cable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
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against foreign government-owned corporations (FGOCs) s by
including FGOCs in its definition of "foreign state."'6
The Act's amendment of the diversity statute, its definition of
foreign states to include FGOCs, and its reference to "nonjury" actions
in granting subject matter jurisdiction raise three questions. First, did
Congress intend the Immunities Act to be the sole basis of jurisdiction
over foreign defendants? Second, did Congress intend to prohibit jury
trial in any action brought under the Act? Finally, if Congress did
intend to preclude jury trials, is that preclusion constitutional when the
defendant is a FGOC?
This note will explore these questions in detail. First it examines
the developments leading up to the Act, analyzes several cases arising
under the Act,7 and traces the Act's legislative history.8 Based on this
survey, the note argues that Congress intended the Immunities Act to
be the sole basis ofjurisdiction over foreign states and FGOCs and that
Congress intended to preclude jury trials in actions involving such
defendants. The note then applies the historical test of seventh
amendment protection to actions involving defendant FGOCs 9 and
demonstrates that the part of the Act precluding jury trial in suits
involving FGOCs is unconstitutional. The note concludes that the Act
should be amended to clarify Congress' intent and to allow jury trial of
FGOC defendants.' 0
5. This note refers to corporations owned by foreign governments as FGOCs, not as
"foreign states," despite the definition of foreign states that Congress adopted in the Act, see infra
note 50.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). For the text of the statute, see infra note 50. This definition
departs from judicial precedents. Courts have long been reluctant to grant immunity to foreign
government-owned commercial corporations. The volume of international trade is simply too
great to allow government-owned corporations to conduct their businesses free from the
possibility of legal sanctions. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 701-05
(1976):
In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise only those powers
peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those powers that can also be exer-
cised by private citizens. Subjecting them in connection with such acts to the same rules
of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to touch very sharply on "national
nerves."
Id at 704; see also Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir.), cer.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Premier S.S. Co. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F. Supp. 507,
510 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Ocean Transp. Co. v. Government of Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp.
703, 705 (E.D. La. 1967).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 11-81.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 82-92.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 93-116.
10. This note does not challenge the traditional rule of international law that a sovereign
government performing "public acts" is immune from suit in the courts of foreign nations. For a
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I. THE HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT
A. The History of Foreign Sovereign Immunity.
Two theories in international law address the immunity of one
state to the judicial process of another: the absolute theory of immu-
nity and the restrictive theory of immunity.' 1 Under the absolute the-
ory, now perhaps espoused only by the Soviet Union and its satellite
states, 12 one state cannot exercise jurisdiction over another without the
other's consent.' 3 Under the restrictive theory, claims arising out of a
state's "public" acts may not be adjudicated, but claims based on the
state's "private" acts may be adjudicated.' 4 Private acts are those in-
volving commercial transactions.' 5 Public acts are those of a govern-
mental nature.16
The United States officially adopted the restrictive theory in 195217
discussion of this and related issues, see Lauterpacht, The Problem ofJurisdictionalImmunities of
Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220 (1951).
11. See Sweeney, The International Law of Sovereign Immunity (U.S. Dep't State Policy
Research Study (1963)). See generally, von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities 4ct of
1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978).
12. The Soviet Union and its satellite states often claim absolute immunity in international
disputes. von Mehren, supra note 11, at 38 n.21.
13. Id at 34. The absolute theory prevailed in international law until about 1900. Id The
United States judicially adopted the absolute theory in 1812. See The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
14. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 701-06 (1976); see H. R. REP. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, repntedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6605, 6606 [herein-
after cited as HousE REPORT]; von Mehren, supra note 11, at 36-43; Note, Sovereign lmmunity of
States Engaged in CommercialActivities, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1086, 1094-98 (1965).
15. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-98 (1976); New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934); Sloan Ship-
yards v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1922); see also von Mehren, supra note
11, at 33-34.
For an example of a private act, see Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d
103, 106 (1966), in which a FGOC entered into a contract to ship grain from the United States to
Greece; see also Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 904 (1824),
in which the Supreme Court denied Georgia's claim of sovereign immunity in a suit arising out of
its operation of a banking business. The court found that the banking business constituted a
private act: "As a member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts
merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power in the management of the affairs of the
corporation, than are expressly given by the incorporating act." Id at 908.
16. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-98 (1976); Rovin Sale Co.
v. Socialist Republic of Rom., 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (N.D. In. 1975); Sea Transp. Corp. v. The
S/T Manhattan, 405 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Examples of public acts include expulsion of aliens, naturalization, acts involving armed
forces, diplomatic activity, and public loans. See Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abas-
tecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
17. Many other governments have adopted this position. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 702 n.15 (1976).
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when the State Department' s issued a letter-the Tate Letter19-to the
Justice Department informing it of the decision. Following the adop-
tion of the restrictive theory, United States courts began to deny immu-
nity to foreign states when the acts challenged were of a purely
commercial nature.20 Although the Tate Letter contained specific
guidelines, the United States' handling of foreign sovereigns in its
courts was defective in many respects. For example, under the doctrine
of Ex Parte Peru,2' both the State Department and the courts had the
power to decide whether to grant immunity.22 To remedy this and sim-
ilar problems, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
in 1976.
The principal objective of the Immunities Act is to codify the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity as it has developed in interna-
tional law and to ensure that the theory will be applied uniformly in
United States courts. Stated broadly, the purpose of the Act is "to fa-
cilitate and depoliticize litigation against foreign states and to minimize
18. The State Department became involved in determining immunity when courts, adhering
less and less to the absolute theory of immunity, began to defer to its advice on whether to grant
immunity. See House REPORT, supra note 14, at 6606; see, e.g., Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30, 35-38 (1945); Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 588 (1943); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria
Gen. de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964); see also Cardozo, Judi.
cial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to
Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963).
19. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). Tate was the acting legal advisor to the State Depart-
ment. His letter informed the Justice Department that the United States would follow the restric-
tive theory of immunity in considering grants of immunity to foreign sovereigns sued by United
States citizens. See von Mehren, supra note 11, at 36-43.
20. von Mehren, supra note I1, at 41. See supra note 6 and cases cited therein (explaining
courts' reluctance to grant immunity to FGOCs specifically).
21. 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943). The Court recognized the practise of allowing a foreign
sovereign to request that its legal problems be solved through diplomatic channels.
22. von Mehren, supra note 11, at 41. A defendent foreign state could litigate its defense of
sovereign immunity in court, or it could ask the State Department to decide the question. If the
State Department recommended immunity, the court would automatically defer to this decision,
following the mandate of Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943). This put the State Department
in a difficult diplomatic situation: it became "a political institution trying to apply a legal stan-
dard to litigation already before the courts." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6607; see also
Cardozo, Sovereign Immuni: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REv. 603
(1954); Collins, The Effectiveness of the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 4 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L.119 (1965); Comment, Restrictive Sovereign Immunity, the State Department, and
the Courts, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 397 (1967).
By way of contrast, some nations apply international law to determine whether to grant im-
munity to a foreign state. In those countries diplomatic considerations play no part in the deci-
sion. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14 at 6608. Because no statute specifically governed suits
against foreign states, there was no definitive standard to determine the validity of a sovereign
immunity defense in the United States. In addition, United States claimants had no way to exe-
cute a judgment against a foreign state. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6605; see also Note,
Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in CommercialActivities, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1086, 1094-95
(1965).
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irritations in foreign relations arising out of such litigation." 23 To
achieve this purpose, the Act provides that the judicial branch alone
shall determine foreign sovereign immunity.24
B. The "Commercial Activities" Exception to Foreign Sovereign
Immunity.
Under the Immunities Act, a foreign state is immune from process
in United States courts25 unless the state's actions on which the suit is
based fall into one of the designated exceptions to immunity.26 If the
number of cases arising under an exception is indicative of its signifi-
cance,27 the most significant exception to immunity is that for "com-
mercial activities having a nexus with the United States."'28 The
commercial activities exception applies in three types of cases:29 com-
mercial activities carried on by a foreign state in the United States,30
commercial activities conducted elsewhere but connected with an act
23. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6605-06.
24. Id at 6606; see also von Mehren, supra note 11, at 45.
25. Although the broad policy of the Immunities Act is that a foreign state is immune when a
suit is brought against it, the foreign state must plead sovereign immunity as an affirmative de-
fense. The burden of proving immunity therefore rests on the defendant foreign state. HousE
REPORT, supra note 14 at 6616.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976) excepts the following cases from the jurisdictional immunity
of the Act:
(1) [those] in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication...
(2) [those] in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) [those] in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue
and that property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity. . . or that property. . . is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state. . . engaged in a commercial activity in
the United States;
(4) [those] in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift
or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue; or
(5) [those] not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above in which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to. . .prop-
erty, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the
scope of his office or employment.
27. See infra note 104 (cases cited), for examples of cases arising under the Act.
28. 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2) (1976). For the text of that section of the Act, see supra note 26.
29. See id.
30. For example, the legislative history mentions the following activities:
commercial transactions performed in whole or in part in the United States, .... busi-
ness torts occurring in the United States. . . , and an indebtedness incurred by a foreign
state which negotiates or executes a loan agreement in the United States, or which
receives financing from a private or public lending institution located in the United
States.
HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6615-16.
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performed in the United States, 31 and commercial acts outside the
United States that have a direct effect in the United States.32
Most cases that raise the jury trial issue33 have been based on the
commercial activity of a corporation that is owned partially or entirely
by a foreign government-a FGOC.34 FGOCs are defined by the Im-
munities Act as foreign states,35 and as such they are apparently enti-
tled to the advantage of a nonjury trial.36 Nevertheless, it is possible
that because their activities will almost always fall into the commercial
activities exception, these FGOCs will never be protected by the restric-
tive theory of immunity, which is the basis of the Immunities Act.
Thus, the Act has created a class of foreign states-FGOCs-that
are ostensibly protected by foreign sovereign immunity. Yet it has also
made an exception to that immunity that includes almost any act a
FGOC could perform, thus making it almost impossible to accord
FGOCs immunity. Finally, it has arguably denied the right to jury
trial in any suit in which immunity does not exist. By legislative fiat,
Congress may have precluded jury trial for a class of defendants that
may never qualify for immunity under the Immunities Act. This result
is not only illogical, it is inconsistent with Congress' treatment of cor-
porations owned by the United States government.
C. United States Government-Owned Corporations and Jury Trial.
Although suits against both foreign and domestic sovereigns were
unknown to the common law,37 it has been the practice in United
31. The legislative history gives examples of this type of activity: "an act in the United States
that violates U.S. securities laws or regulations; the wrongful discharge in the United States of an
employee of the foreign state who has been employed in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in some third country." HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6617-18.
32. The legislative history states that this situation "would embrace commercial conduct
abroad having direct effects within the United States which would subject such conduct to the
exercise ofjurisdiction by the United States consistent with. . .Restatement of the Law, Second,
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965)." Id at 6618.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 58-80 and note 104 for a discussion of these cases.
34. See, e.g., Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 62 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores Inca Cepac Yupangui,
639 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1981); Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 510 F. Supp. 737, 738
(E.D. La. 1981).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1) (1976).
36. Defining FGOCs as foreign states in the Immunities Act brings them within the purview
of the Act and forces courts to deal with the "nonjury" language of the Act's subject matter juris-
diction provision. See supra note 4. If a court determines that it has jurisdiction over a FGOC
only under the Act, and that the Act requires nonjury trial, the other party-litigant is denied a jury
trial. See Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1981), ceri. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1971 (1982); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores Inca Cepac Yupangui, 639 F.2d 872,
875 (2d Cir. 1981); see also infra text accompanying notes 67-81.
37. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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States courts that suits against commercial corporations owned by the
United States are tried before a jury. For example, in Panama Railroad
Co. v. Curran38 and Panama Railroad Co. v. Minnix, 39 the courts ruled
that the Railroad could be sued like any other corporation even though
the United States was its sole stockholder. Both suits involved personal
injury claims and both were tried before juries.40
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) is similar
to the FGOCs that are often the subject of suit in the United States.
Amtrak's stock is owned entirely by the United States government. 41 It
is supported by federal appropriations and by federally guaranteed
loan funds.42 By statute, however, Amtrak is not an agency or estab-
lishment of the United States government.43 Therefore, claims against
Amtrak may be tried before a jury. Thus, when an instrumentality of
the United States government is in reality a commercial enterprise, ac-
tions against it may be tried by jury. Although it would seem reason-
able for Congress to treat FGOCs in the same manner, it appears that
Congress has chosen to preclude jury trials of FGOCs.
D. The Jury Preclusion Issue.
FGOCs, whose actions are not likely to be immune under the Act
because of the commercial activities exception,44 are often involved in
litigation that traditionally warrants jury trial.45 Thus, it is important
to determine conclusively whether the plaintiff in a suit against a
FGOC has the right to a jury trial under the Immunities Act. The
United States plaintiff may demand a jury trial, hoping that American
jurors will be more sympathetic to his cause than to that of the foreign
defendant. The foreign defendant will probably resist such a demand,
38. 256 F. 768 (5th Cir. 1919). The Curran court stated that "[ftrom the fact that one owns all
the stock of a private corporation it does not follow that the acts of the corporation are to be
treated, not as its acts, but as acts of its sole stockholder." Id at 772.
39. 282 F. 47 (5th Cir. 1922). Significantly, the court stated that the "liability of the Panama
Railroad Company to suit, as any other railroad company, and its property to seizure, is not
affected by the fact that the United States is the sole stockholder." Id at 49.
40. See Curran, 256 F. at 772; Minnix, 282 F. at 51 (appellate court implies that lower court
judgment was by jury).
41. 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1976).
42. 45 U.S.C. §§ 541, 601, 602, 621 (1976). See generally Adams, The National Railroad Pas-
senger Corporation-A Modern Hybird Corporation Neither Private nor Public, 31 Bus. LAW. 601
(1976).
43. 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1976).
44. For a discussion of this exception, see supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
45. Tort and contract claims, traditionally recognized as legal in nature, are common claims
against FGOCs, see infra note 104 (cases cited), and there is a seventh amendment right to jury
trial in actions based on legal claims seeking legal remedies, see infra text accompanying notes 96-
116.
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fearing juror prejudice in favor of the United States plaintiff.46
Ascertaining the state of the law concerning the plaintiffs request
for a jury trial when the defendant is a foreign state requires unraveling
a complex statute. The litigation that has arisen under the Act evi-
dences the confusion surrounding the issue of jury preclusion and the
judicial response reveals a diversity of opinion on the issue. To clarify
the jury preclusion issue, it is necessary to examine the statutory
changes made under the Act, the case law interpreting these changes,
and the legislative history of the Act.
1. Statutory Changes Affecting the Right to a Jury Trial. Before
the Act, the federal district courts had diversity jurisdiction in all civil
actions involving more than $10,000 when the controversy was between
"citizens of a State, andforeign states or citizens or subjects thereof. ' 47
The Immunities Act significantly alters the diversity statute by provid-
ing for jurisdiction when the controversy is between "citizens of a State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state."'48 The change thus deletes
the category of "foreign states" from those litigants who qualify as par-
ties in a diversity suit, apparently foreclosing diversity-in which jury
trial is not precluded-as a basis for jurisdiction over cases involving
foreign states.
The Act's subject matter jurisdiction provision gives district courts
original jurisdiction over nonjury civil actions against foreign states in-
volving in personam claims for which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity under the Act.49 The Act's definition of a foreign state in-
cludes not only the foreign state government, but also its political sub-
divisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. 50 The Act then defines an
agency or instrumentality as any entity "which is a separate legal per-
46. See Note, Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores and Rex v. Cia. Pervana de
Vapores: Jury Preclusion in Actions Against Foreign Soyereign-owned Instrumentalities, 20 Colum.
J Transnat'l . 199 (1981).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976) (emphasis added). For the complete text of the former
statute, see supra note 2.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). For the text of the amended diversity statute, see supra
note 3.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). For the text of this provision, see supra note 4.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). That statute provides as follows:
For purposes of this chapter- (a) A "foreign state". . . includes a political subdivision
of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsec-
tion (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of
a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States. . .nor created under the
laws of any third country.
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son, corporate or otherwise." 51 This definition allows the treatment of
wholly government-owned corporations as foreign states for purposes
of the Act.52
A final statutory change relating to the jury trial issue is the addi-
tion of section 1441(d) to the judicial code.5 3 Section 1441(d) allows
actions against foreign states to be removed from state to federal court.
This section also provides that removed actions are to be tried by the
court, with no right to a jury trial.54
The statutory changes appear to preclude jury trials in section
1330 cases involving foreign states. The removal of the words "foreign
state" from the diversity statute indicates that Congress wanted to
avoid the bringing of suits against foreign states under a provision that
allows jury trial.55 The new removal statute demonstrates that Con-
gress did not intend such actions to be tried by a jury after they are
removed from state to federal court.56 Clearly, the drafters of the Act
would make no distinction between removed and original actions with
regard to the jury issue;57 therefore, they must have intended that both
types of actions would not be tried to a jury. On its face, the Immuni-
ties Act precludes jury trial.
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Act. Several cases have examined
the language of the Act. One of the first was Icenogle v. Olympic Air-
;ways.58 The Icenogle court interpreted the Act to preclude jury trial
but apparently believed that denial of jury trials in cases against for-
51. Id § 1603(b)(1).
52. The courts have applied this provision in several cases. See, e.g., Rex v. Cia. Pervana de
Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 64 (3d. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982); Ruggiero v.
Compania Peruana de Vapores Inca Cepac Yupangui, 639 F.2d 872, 875 (1981); Williams v. Ship-
ping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526, 528 (E.D. Va. 1980), qaTd, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982); Herman v. El Al Isr. Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 277, 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976) provides as follows: "Any civil action brought in a State court
against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign
state to the district court .... Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without jury."
54. Id Courts have relied on this provision in holding that there is no right to jury trial under
the Act. See Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1971 (1982); Herman v. El Al Isr. Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
55. Jury trial is available under both the diversity statute (28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)) and the
federal question statute (28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976)).
56. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
57. See Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1154 (4th Cir. 1982). That court
stated that "[b]ecause the jurisdiction of a district court over an action brought against a foreign
state is the same whether the action is commenced in federal court or removed from a state court,
we conclude that the text of §1441(d) more clearly expresses congressional intent than §1330(a).
58. 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979). Icenogle involved wrongful death actions arising out of a
commercial airliner crash. The plaintiffs were United States citizens and the defendant was a
corporation owned by the Greek government.
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eign states would violate the seventh amendment. The court examined
the diversity statute which, as modified by the Act,5 9 provides that
plaintiffs may sue "citizens or subjects of a foreign state," and con-
cluded that the defendant FGOC fell into that category.60 The court
therefore allowed a jury trial6' and avoided the jury preclusion issue.
The Icenogle court based its conclusion on a highly technical con-
struction of the Immunities Act. The Act confers jurisdiction when the
defendant is a foreign state. Chapter 97, section 1603 of the Act defines
the term "foreign state." 62 This definition is cross-referenced to chapter
85, section 1330, the section of the Act conferring jurisdiction.63 There
is no similar cross-reference to section 1332, the diversity statute. The
court noted that the definition states that it is "[flor purposes of this
chapter"; that is, chapter 97.64 The court reasoned that because section
1332 is not in chapter 97, the phrase "citizens or subjects of a foreign
state" in that section is unaffected by the definition in section 1603.
Therefore, a defendant may be subject to suit under both the Immuni-
ties Act and the diversity statute.65 The court concluded that if Con-
gress had intended to deny jury trials to United States citizens suing
"foreign government-owned commercial corporations" under the di-
versity statute, it could have included an express provision to that effect
in the Immunities Act.66
In Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores Inca Cepac
Yupangui,67 which also involved defendant FGOCs that met the sec-
tion 1603 definition of foreign states,68 the court reached the opposite
result: it concluded that Congress intended the Act to be the sole basis
for jurisdiction over foreign states. The plaintiffs had argued that a
FGOC may be classified as a citizen or subject of the foreign state and
is thus amenable to suit under the diversity statute. They based their
59. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
60. 82 F.R.D. at 37.
61. Id
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1603. See supra note 50 for the text of this provision.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1330. See supra note 4 for the text of this provision.
64. See supra note 50.
65. 82 F.R.D. at 38. The court supported its decision by noting that the case was an original
action, not a removal action. The Act clearly precludes jury trial when the action is removed; an
original action is not such a clear-cut case. Id Compare this rationale with the reasoning in
Ruggiero, see infra text accompanying notes 67-76.
66. 82 F.R.D. at 39.
67. 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981). This case involved claims for damages for personal injuries.
The plaintiffs brought suit under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).
68. The three defendants in the case were shipping companies wholly owned by their respec-
tive governments: Peru, Poland and Indonesia. 639 F.2d at 873. Thus, they were foreign states
under § 1603(b)(2), see supra note 50.
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argument, similar to that of the plaintiffs in Icenogle,69 on the long ac-
cepted maxim that a corporation is a citizen or subject of the state that
granted its charter. 70 Accordingly, a plaintiff should have the choice to
sue the foreign corporation either as a "foreign state" under section
1330 of the Immunities Act, or as a "citizen or subject of a foreign
state" under section 1332, the diversity statute.7' The Ruggiero court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the same entity "cannot be both
a foreign state and a citizen or subject of a foreign state."72 The court
explained that considering foreign corporations to be citizens of their
states of incorporation was a fiction to facilitate suits against such cor-
porations.73 That fiction, according to the court, was made unnecessary
by the Immunities Act. The court viewed the "foreign state" definition
in section 1603 of the Act as conclusive on the issue of how FGOCs are
to be treated. Thus, under Ruggiero, FGOC defendants are treated like
foreign states: they may be sued only under the Immunities Act.
The Ruggiero court found further support in section 1441(d), the
removal statute, for its conclusion that the Immunities Act is the only
basis of jurisdiction over FGOCs. 74 The court reasoned that Congress
could not logically have intended to deny jury trial-as does the re-
moval statute-when the action is removed to federal court, and allow
it when the action originates in federal court.75 Allowing suit under
section 1332 would create this anomalous situation. The court con-
cluded that the Immunities Act adds a third category to the existing
federal jurisdictional bases: actions against foreign states.76
Plaintiffs have also attempted to avoid the Act's prohibition
against juries by claiming jurisdiction under the federal question stat-
ute. In Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A. ,77 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit overturned a district court decision allowing suit
against FGOCs under the federal question statute.78 The district court
69. See supra text accompanying notes 58-65.
70. 639 F.2d at 875.
71. Id As in Icenogle, the plaintiff would have had the right to a jury trial under the diversity
statute.
72. Id at 875.
73. Id The traditional view was that because the shareholders of a corporation were citizens
or subjects of a foreign state, the corporation itself was a citizen or subject of the state. The suit
was actually against those shareholders. Id
74. Id at 877-78.
75. Id at 876 n.7.
76. Id at 876.
77. 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982). This case, like Ruggiero,
see supra note 67, involved claims for personal injuries and was brought under the LHWCA.
78. The federal question statute provides as follows: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
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had concluded that because Congress had not amended the federal
question statute when it passed the Immunities Act, it had left an alter-
native basis for jurisdiction over foreign states when the claim is based
on a law, a treaty, or the Constitution of the United States.79 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that although Congress
"could have stated [it] with more elegance," its intent was to make the
Immunities Act the exclusive basis for jurisdiction when foreign states
are defendants. 80
Although the majority is not overwhelming,81 most courts inter-
pret the Immunities Act in accordance with Ruggiero and Rex, holding
that Congress intended the Act to be the only basis for jurisdiction over
a FGOC. The Ieenogle court makes the strongest argument for the
minority position, emphasizing that Congress could have explicitly re-
moved FGOCs from the scope of the diversity statute if it so intended.
Nevertheless, the strained reasoning the court had to employ to reach
what it viewed as the constitutionally correct result demonstrates the
weakness of the Act's approach to the jury trial issue. Although Con-
gress failed to express clearly its intentions with regard to jury trial, the
statutory changes and the judicial response to the Immunities Act indi-
cate that Congress meant to preclude jury trials in actions under the
Act. The legislative history supports this conclusion.
3. Legislative History of the Act. Congress intended section 1330
to be a "comprehensive jurisdictional scheme" for cases involving for-
eign states.8 2 Congress muddled this scheme, however, by introducing
the jury issue into its grant of subject matter jurisdiction.83 The Act's
reference to jury trials could be interpreted to mean that Congress in-
tended that only those actions traditionally tried to the court could be
brought under the Act. If this interpretation were correct, a court
would have to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction actions brought under the
Act if it found they should be tried before a jury,8 4 unless it could gain
$10,000... and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States . . . ." 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
79. See Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd,
660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982).
80. 660 F.2d at 64.
81. Of the fourteen cases that have considered requests for jury trial under the Act, see infra
note 104 (cases cited), eleven have denied jury trial and three have granted it.
82. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6611. When the Act was passed, the House bill was
adopted in lieu of the Senate bill. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6605. For this reason, the
House Report is the legislative history examined here.
83. See supra note 4 for the Act's definition of subject matter jurisdiction.
84. See Smit, The Foreign Sovereign ImmunitiesAct of1976: A Pleafor Drastic Surgery, 1980
Proc. Am Sec)' Int'l L 49, 57.
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jurisdiction on an alternative ground.85 This interpretation, however, is
unsupported by the legislative history, and has not been adopted by
any court.
The alternative interpretation is that Congress, in linking the jury
issue to subject matter jurisdiction, intended to preclude jury trial in all
actions against foreign states. This interpretation leads to the conclu-
sion that Congress intended jurisdiction over foreign states to be based
only on the Immunities Act, because the other bases for federal juris-
diction do not preclude jury trial.86 Indeed, the use of the word "com-
prehensive" in the legislative history 7 may indicate that Congress
intended that the other possible bases for federal jurisdiction in these
cases, diversity and federal question jurisdiction, would not apply.
Neither the Act nor the legislative history, however, explicitly states
that these other bases of jurisdiction are no longer available for actions
against foreign state defendants.88 In fact, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee report does not mention the federal question statute, but it spe-
cifically discusses the diversity statute. The report states that the
passage of the Immunities Act makes a similar jurisdictional basis for
foreign states under the diversity statute "superfluous."8 9 The Commit-
tee did not, however, declare that the Act preempts the diversity
statute.
In the Committee's only reference to the jury trial issue, it merely
compares suits against foreign states to suits against the United
States,90 boldly asserting that jury trials are excluded under the Act.91
The committee report does not reveal discussions on the constitutional-
ity of such an exclusion. This omission demonstrates that there was
85. The judge would find diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction if the com-
plaint in the case alleged facts sufficient to support such jurisdiction.
86. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 67-80, this interpretation has been
adopted by some courts. See, e.g., Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores Inca Cepac
Yupangui, 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th
Cir. 1981).
87. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6611.
88. In Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, 82 F.R.D. 36, 38 (D.D.C. 1979), the court held that
because Congress was not explicit about whether the Act was to be the sole basis ofjurisdiction, it
could maintain jurisdiction under the diversity statute.
89. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6613. In examining this part of the legislative history,
the court in Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1971 (1982), stated that "the FSIA discloses a clear intention to withhold jury trial in all
actions against foreign states. . ." Id at 65. The court went on to conclude that the Immunities
Act provides the only basis for jurisdiction over foreign state defendants. Id. For a discussion of
the plaintiff's argument in Rex that jurisdiction should be based on the federal question statute,
see supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
90. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6611.
91. Id
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little, if any, contemplation of the effects of this part of the Act. The
report also reveals that the Committee did not consider whether
designating FGOCs as foreign states would give them the privilege of
protection from jury trials. It simply stated that its reason for preclud-
ing jury trials was to promote "uniformity in decision," avoiding com-
plicated foreign relations problems.92 The Committee apparently
decided that jury verdicts would be inconsistent and that this inconsis-
tency might offend foreign states. By failing to draft the Act in clear
language, the Committee left the courts to deal with the effect of the
Act on the seventh amendment right to jury trial.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRECLUDING JURY TRIALS
WHEN FGOCs ARE DEFENDANTS
Whether Congress may preclude jury trials of FGOC defendants
is subject to debate. 93 This note argues that such preclusion is uncon-
stitutional. FGOCs are "foreign states" only because the Immunities
Act so defines them. They are in reality commercial corporations that
should not receive the protection traditionally accorded to foreign sov-
ereigns. Therefore, jury trial should be available in an action against a
FGOC if a jury trial would be available against some other defendant.
Since the early days of the British empire, trial by jury has been a
cherished right in the common law system. 94 Blackstone observed that
the Magna Carta insisted on it as "the principal bulwark of our liber-
ties."' 95 The United States has followed this tradition. The seventh
amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to
trial by jury in suits at common law.96 In determining the scope of the
seventh amendment, then, the question is, what is a suit at common
law? In Parsons v. Bedford,97 the Supreme Court of the United States
shed light on this question:
By common law, they [the writers of the amendment] meant ... not
merely suits which the common law recognized among its old and
settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascer-
tained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable
92. Id at 6612.
93. See Note, supra note 27 (concluding that the Act's preclusion of juries is constitutional).
94. See, e.g., 2 JONE'S BLACKSTONE § 459a.
95. Id; see also Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959).
96. The seventh amendment provides as follows:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by a jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
97. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 474 (1830).
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rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were adminis-
tered .... 98
The traditional determination of whether an action is triable to a
jury has therefore been whether the claim is legal. Legal claims are
triable to a jury; equitable claims are triable to the court.99 As to what
makes a claim legal, the Supreme Court in Scott v. Neely' ° ° stated that
"[a]il actions which seek to recover. . . a money judgment for breach
of a simple contract, or as damages for injury to person or property, are
legal actions . ,,"1I More recently, the Court in Pernell v. Southall
Realty'0 2 noted that it "has long assumed that actions. . . for dam-
ages to a person or property. . . are actions at law triable to a jury."'10 3
For purposes of analyzing the Act's preclusion of jury trial of FGOCs,
the question is whether actions against FGOCs are capable of legal
remedy. If a legal remedy exists in any action, then it must be tried
before a jury.
In each of the fourteen cases in which a plaintiff suing a FGOC
has requested a jury trial, the defendant "foreign state" has been a
commercial entity.'0 4 The most common claims made against these de-
98. Id at 79.
99. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 450 (1976).
100. 140 U.S. 106 (1891). Scott v. Neely was a suit in equity in which a creditor sought to
reach certain property in payment of a contract debt. The Court held that the claim was cogniza-
ble only at law and could not be brought in an equity action. Id. at 117; see also Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370 (1974) (quoting Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151
(1891)).
101. 140 U.S. at 110.
102. 416 U.S. 363 (1974). Pernell dealt with the question whether trial by jury is guaranteed in
an action to recover possession of real property. Southall Realty attempted to evict Pernell from
his residence for alleged nonpayment of rent. Id at 363. The Court held that the right to jury
trial must be preserved in actions such as this one where common law rights and remedies are
involved. Id at 383.
103. Id at 370. The Supreme Court has jealously guarded the right to jury trial in civil ac-
tions. In Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), for example, the Court rejected the conten-
tion that the presence of a basic equitable issue deprives the litigant of the right to a jury trial on
the legal issues presented. Id at 477. Dairy Queen involved an action alleging breach of a licens-
ing contract. The lower courts denied the defendants' request for jury trial on the ground that
plaintiffs' requests for an injunction and an accounting were equitable. The Supreme Court held,
however, that "[a]s an action on a debt allegedly due under a contract, it would be difficult to
conceive of an action of a more traditionally legal character." Id at 477. The Court allowed jury
trial, relying on language in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), which states
that if a claim is properly cognizable at law, then every effort should be made to preserve the right
to jury trial. A mixture of equitable and legal claims is not, therefore, sufficient reason for denying
jury trial. Id at 510.
104. See Rex v. Cia Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 62 (3d Cir. 1981) (jury trial de-
nied), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1971 (1982); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India 653 F.2d 875 (4th
Cir. 1981) (jury trial denied), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1490 (1982); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana
de Vapores Inca Cepac Yupangui, 639 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1981) (jury trial denied); Alvarez v.
National Shipping Corp., No. 80-491, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1982) (jury trial denied); Goar v.
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fendants were in tort or contract.'0 - The tort or contract claimant usu-
ally seeks damages or some other money judgment: a legal remedy.
Thus, the plaintiff with a tort or contract claim against a FGOC has a
legal action that meets the historical test for seventh amendment pro-
tection. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to a jury.
Congress 106 and some courts 07 have concluded, however, that be-
cause suits against a foreign sovereign as well as the domestic sover-
eign, the United States, were unknown to the common law courts of
1791,108 the preclusion of jury trial under the Immunities Act is justi-
fied even though the result is that plaintiffs suing FGOCs are denied
jury trials. A similar argument was rejected, however, in Curtis v.
Loether.10 9 In Curtis, the plaintiff brought suit for injunctive relief and
punitive damages under section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
The district court denied the defendant's request for a jury, holding
that jury trial was neither authorized by Title VIII nor required by the
seventh amendment."10 The plaintiff's argument against jury trial was
that the seventh amendment does not apply to "new causes of action
created by congressional enactment.""' The Supreme Court rejected
this argument, holding that the seventh amendment applies to "actions
enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the
statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for
Companie Peruana de Vapores, 510 F. Supp. 737, 738 (E.D. La. 1981) (jury trial denied);
Rapaport v. Banco Mexicano Somex, No. 80-435, slip. op. (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1980) (jury trial
denied); Herman v. El Al Isr. Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 277, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (jury trial
denied); Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980) (jury trial granted),
vacated, 667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982) (denying jury trial); Cucullu v. M/V Odessa, No. 78-3344
(E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1980) (unpublished order) (jury trial denied); Lonon v. Companhia de Vavega-
cao Lloyd Basiliero, 85 F.R.D. 71, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (jury trial granted); DiMartino v. S.C. India
Corp., No. 75-1485 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1979) (unpublished order) (jury trial denied); East Europe
Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 384 (S.D.N.Y.) (jury trial denied), aj'd, 610
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, 82 F.R.D. 36, 37 (D.D.C. 1979) (jury trial
granted); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 388-89 (D. Del. 1978) (jury trial
denied).
105. See supra notes 58-80 and accompanying text (discussing Icenogle, Ruggiero, and Rex)
and note 104 (cases cited).
106. See HOUSE REP., supra note 14, at 6611.
107. See Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1971 (1982); Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores Inca Cepac Yupangui 639 F.2d
872, 881 (2d Cir. 1981).
108. Herman v. El Al Isr. Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (and authorities
cited therein); accord Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores Inca Cepac Yupangui, 639 F.2d
872, 879 (2d Cir. 1981).
109. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
110. Id at 191.
111. Id at 193.
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damages in the ordinary courts of law."' 1 2
Plaintiffs with legal claims against FGOCs are denied seventh
amendment protection by the Immunities Act chiefly because such de-
fendants qualify, under a technical definition, as "foreign states."" 3
Many of these defendants are owned by foreign governments; often,
however, this ownership is a reflection of the political and social struc-
ture of their countries. 14 It is a characteristic of socialist governments
that business and industry are owned by the state. 15 This political dif-
ference between the United States and many of the countries it trades
with should not work against United States litigants suing commercial
entities that have broken contracts or committed torts. 16
III CONCLUSION
Congress, through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, at-
tempted to provide a comprehensive procedure by which litigants could
prosecute claims against foreign states. In its zeal, Congress failed to
consider carefully the language in which it framed this procedure. Its
grant of subject matter jurisdiction does not clearly indicate whether
the Act is the sole basis for jurisdiction over foreign states. 1' 7  The
weight of authority and the legislative history indicate that without de-
bate or consideration of the constitutional implications of its action,
112. Id at 194. Although the Court acknowledged that Congress can create administrative
procedures and remedies where jury trial is not required, it emphasized the importance of jury
trials in ordinary civil actions:
But when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil ac-
tion in the district courts, where there is obviously no functional justification for denying
the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the action involves rights and reme-
dies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law.
Id at 195.
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976).
114. See Rabinowitz, Can the Court Cope with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, I N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 131, 132-33 (1980).
115. See Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 Nw.
U.L. Rav. 109, 111-13 (1961) (discussing the paradox of socialistic governments and foreign sover-
eign immunity).
116. Even when absolute sovereign immunity was the rule in United States courts, FGOCs
were not presumed to be immune. As corporations, they were private party litigants, and if they
chose to assert immunity as a defense it had to be claimed by an agent of the sovereign. Kunglig
Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 891, 892-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), aj'd, 32
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1929). If immunity was granted, it was only after consideration of the nature of
the action. In Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924), the court found that
the action was only nominally against the National Railways of Mexico. It was "in reality a suit
only against the Mexican government." Id at 661. Thus, the court granted immunity. The Mexi-
can government operated the railroad as it would any government agency. The scope of the Im-
munities Act is much broader, causing the issue of sovereign immunity to turn, in many instances,
on mere stock ownership.
117. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
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Congress apparently intended to preclude jury trial in cases brought
under the Act.118
An application of the historical test for seventh amendment pro-
tection demonstrates that a bar to jury trials in these cases is unconsti-
tutional." 9 United States citizens deal regularly with foreign
corporations or their products. 2o The Immunities Act denies these citi-
zens the protection of their own constitution simply because the corpo-
rations with which they deal are partially or wholly owned by a foreign
government.
Congress should amend the Act to correct these deficiencies. The
mention of jury trial in the Act itself is an error. Courts have no choice
but to deny jury trial in cases against a FGOC because the Act incorpo-
rates jury preclusion as a prerequisite to jurisdiction.' 21 One solution
to this dilemma is to remove the language concerning juries from the
Act. This action would leave judges free to consider the merits of al-
lowing jury trial in particular cases. 22 Another solution is to add to the
Act a provision allowing jury trial in suits under the Act if the defend-
ant is a FGOC.123
The best solution, however, is to remove FGOCs from the Act's
definition of "foreign state." The Act would then provide for immunity
in any situation in which a FGOC performs public acts, thus protecting
the FGOC if it does in fact function as a sovereign. 24 This solution
preserves the Immunities Act preclusion of jury trial in actions against
foreign sovereigns. It also allows courts to treat FGOCs conducting
commercial acts as they would any other litigant and avoids the consti-
tutional deficiencies now present in the Act.
Kimberol K Hill
118. See supra notes 58-92 and accompanying text.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 93-116.
120. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6605.
121. See Smit, supra note 84, at 57. For the text of the subject matter provision, section
1330(a), see supra note 4.
122. The decision whether to recognize a claim of immunity would be made before the action
reached a jury. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6616. The foreign state would therefore not be
subject to a jury trial on the issue of immunity.
123. Such a provision might resemble the Amtrak statute. See supra text accompanying note
43.
124. It is difficult to imagine what acts by a FGOC could be classified as public, see supra note
16 (examples of public acts); therefore, a FGOC would rarely be granted immunity under the
proposed revision of the Act.
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